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The federal government’s rigidly structured civil service personnel management 
system creates a climate of inflexibility and stasis, where length of service is 
prioritized above innovative, responsive performance. The nature of work has 
changed in the nearly seven decades since the current personnel system was 
implemented. Over time, the federal workforce has become increasingly 
knowledge-based, professionalized, and mature.  
At the macroergonomic level, the civil service personnel management 
organization is a system interface through which human work performance and 
job design is managed. It is possible to evaluate problems that exist within the 
human-organizational interface (HOI) and formulate recommendations for 
changes to improve harmonization. This review identified and focused on specific 
elements within the personnel management system that need to change. Effort 
should be applied by OPM and their component agencies to target specific areas 
of rigidity, complexity, and hierarchical structure to improve the predictability, 
adaptability, responsiveness, and flexibility of the civil service personnel 
management system. OPM should translate the merit system principles through 
improved operational guidance to more accurately mirror and more fully 
implement those principles. If this is accomplished, it will lead to improved 
harmonization between the organizational system and civil service employees 
who interact with it. 
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The federal government’s rigidly structured civil service personnel 
management system that governs the majority of white-collar federal employees 
in the U.S. creates a climate of inflexibility and stasis, where length of service is 
prioritized above innovative, responsive performance. It fails to account for an 
ever-changing workforce and mission, both of which – as will be argued - require 
more flexibility and less rigidity if the federal workforce is to continue to support 
and enable the important work of the government. A primary concern is the effect 
of the civil service personnel management system’s rigidity on job classification, 
compensation, promotion, and advancement, and the downstream effects on the 
ability of the organization to attract, select, hire, and retain suitably skilled 
employees.  
The purpose of this evaluation is to a) define areas of incongruity that exist 
between the workforce and the organizational system that governs job 
classification, compensation, promotion, and advancement b) identify the specific 
factors that represent feasible opportunities for intervention, and c) provide 
recommendations to improve harmonization between the organization, or work 
system, and its predominantly modern, knowledge-based workforce. This 
evaluation will focus specifically on the problem of rigidity and u predictability 
within the civil service personnel management organization and how the opposite 
– the promotion of flexibility, adaptability, and predictability  - will improve 
harmonization of the system. 
A. THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A HUMAN-ORGANIZATION INTERFACE (HOI) 
The nature of work has changed in the nearly seven decades since the 
current personnel system was implemented. The organizational characteristics 
that reward retention and longevity also promote a culture that is antithetical to 
innovation and achievement and improved human performance. Over time, the 
federal workforce has become increasingly knowledge-based, professionalized, 
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and mature; according to an analysis performed by the Government 
Accountability Office, today’s federal workforce is more highly educated than the 
American workforce overall. The GS pay scale and other elements of the civil 
service personnel management system no longer accounts for this and other 
demographic factors (or they never did) (Katz, 2014; Government Accountability 
Office, 2012). This has rendered the organizational system a relic from “a time 
when most federal jobs were clerical and required few specialized skills, and 
when the government’s role in society was smaller and far less complicated” 
(Building the Enterprise, 2014). Today’s knowledge workers have different 
abilities and perform their work in order to meet very different mission 
requirements. Unlike the workforce it serves, the rigid personnel management 
system with which the civil service workforce interfaces has not changed 
significantly in the several decades; it no longer fits. This fundamental mismatch 
evolved over time, as the workforce and the work it does changed. It is therefore 
important to understand how the system, as it is currently implemented, affects 
its workforce and work products and to determine what can be done about it. 
In human systems integration, specifically in the domain of human factors 
engineering (microergonomics), practitioners who understand both system 
constraints and behaviors and human capabilities and limitations work to identify 
and correct problems that exist in the design of systems with which end-users 
interact in order to improve the human-machine interface (HMI). At the 
macroergonomic level, the civil service personnel management organization is a 
system interface through which human work performance and job design is 
managed. Like efforts to improve HMI, it is possible to evaluate problems that 
exist within the human-organizational interface (HOI) and formulate 
recommendations for changes to improve harmonization. That interface can and 
should be altered, where necessary, to address an organization’s structure, 
practices, and culture. These changes could be referred to as HOI 
improvements. When the appropriate adjustments that adhere to HOI principles 
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are made, the result is increased harmony between the organization and its 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The original implementation of civil service reform began with passage of 
the first Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), known as the Pendleton Act, in 1883. 
This legislation established the Civil Service Commission and replaced a 
politically based and corruptible spoils system. “The Commission, led by the 
energetic Teddy Roosevelt, laid the foundations of an impartial, professional civil 
service based on the merit principle – that employees should be judged only on 
how well they can do the job“ (“Our Mission,” n.d.). Another CSRA passed in 
1978 represented another attempt to improve performance and increase 
protections of federal employees. That CSRA, Public Law 95-454, Statute 1111, 
abolished the U.S. Civil Service Commission and established the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), alongside the Merit Systems Protection Board 
and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 
1978).  
OPM, the agency that is responsible for personnel management of the 
civil service in the U.S. federal government, declares its mission to be “recruiting, 
retaining, and honoring a world-class force to serve the American people” (“Our 
Mission,” n.d.). As shown in Figure 1, the organization’s numerous roles include 
– but are not limited to - development, oversight, implementation, and 
enforcement of policies related to position classification, hiring authority, 
performance management, compensation, leave, and benefits. Key OPM 
objectives include improvement of selection and hiring processes, promoting 
fairness and flexibility in compensation, and retention of a workforce that befits 
the diverse and versatile demands of the work of the federal government. 
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Figure 1. The domains of the U.S. Civil Service Personnel Management System. 
1. Description of the General Schedule Compensation System 
The General Schedule (GS) covers compensation of federal white-collar 
personnel, but is also tied to and influences a larger, more complex 
organizational system that also prescribes – among other things - job 
categorization and advancement/promotion for nearly 1.5 million employees, or 
approximately 80% of civilian white-collar workforce (General Schedule 
Classification and Pay, 2014). The federal government also employs workers 
under other pay systems, but this evaluation focuses specifically on white-collar 
jobs and employees within the GS structure, and the civil service personnel 
system through which their hiring, compensation, advancement/promotion – and 
ultimately, their performance – is managed. 
The GS system was created through passage of the Classification Act of 
1949 and is administered by OPM. The Classification Act grew out of 
recommendations from the Commissions on Organization of the Executive 
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Branch of the Government, also known as the Hoover Commissions. At the time 
that the Classification Act and its accordant implementation of the GS system 
was passed, it was regarded as a major improvement, a leap forward, because it 
involved a consolidation and broad standardization of many disparate 
compensation systems, thereby increasing consistency and transparency. This 
enhanced both the public’s and the workforce’s perception of the system’s 
fairness and equity, “countering patronage and establishing a federal workforce 
based on neutral competence” (Woodward, 2005). 
Some of the other recommendations to come out of the Hoover 
Commissions included “category rating, simplified and more effective 
performance ratings, and selection processes for supervisory jobs that focused 
more on ability to be a supervisor than on technical experience. The Hoover 
Commission also recommended pay include locality or industry differentials” 
(Neal, 2014). While not all of these recommendations were implemented, they 
were prescient of future complaints that would arise and carry reform of the civil 
service forward into the 21st century. 
For each job series, there are fifteen hierarchical levels or grades (GS-1 
through GS-15), shown in Figure 2. For each of the fifteen GS grades, there are 
10 steps (steps 1-10) that set pay rates for each step within those grades. These 
grades and levels correspond to categories (or rates) of job performance. 
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Figure 2. The General Schedule salary table for 2014 (“Salary Table,” 2014). The salary table 
does not include locality pay adjustments.  
Additional detail and subsequent analysis/assessment of how specific 
rates for grades are determined, and what level of performance is associated 
with each grade can be found on the OPM website. 
2. Classification of General Schedule Jobs 
Among its many roles as the administrator of the civil service personnel 
management system, OPM provides “Federal position classification, job grading, 
and qualifications information that is used to determine the pay plan, series, title, 
grade, and qualification requirements for most work in the Federal Government” 
(“Classification & Qualifications,” n.d.). Based on statutory guidance in the 
Classification Act of 1949, OPM derived an occupational classification system for 
positions included in the General Schedule that groups types of work by major 
and minor types into occupational series and grades.  
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Each white-collar job description details precise qualifications that can 
also be found in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). The last 
revision of the SOC, released in 2010, has 23 major occupational groups, within 
which there are 97 minor groups and over 420 different standardized occupations 
(GAO, 2014). There are 840 detailed occupations, and these individual jobs are 
identified by four-digit job series codes (“Standard Occupational Classification,” 
2010). Additional volumes of documentation were then developed, in the form of 
both position classification and job family standards, to define individual 
occupations and detail the specific work activities associated with job series 
codes. These also provide grading criteria for jobs that are classified under the 
General Schedule.  
Further information can be found in OPM’s Introduction to the Position 
Classification Standards and the Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families 
(“Introduction to the Position Classification Standards,” n.d., “Handbook of 
Occupational Groups and Families,” n.d.).  
3. Advancement and Promotion in the GS system 
GS pay is typically adjusted via an annual across-the-board pay increase. 
Pay raises, or within-grade increases (WGI), are granted based on employees’ 
longevity in that step - provided they meet expectations - at automatic intervals of 
1 year at steps 1-3, 2 years at steps 4-6, and 3 years at steps 7-9. “GS 
employees may advance to higher grades by promotion at certain intervals 
(generally after at least a year), as determined by OPM regulations and 
qualification standards and agency policies, up to the full promotion potential 
advertised in the job announcement” (“Classification & Pay,” n.d.). 
Compensation is also adjusted according to locality, using “a geographic-
based percentage rate that reflects pay levels for non-Federal workers in certain 
geographic areas as determined by surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics” (“Classification and Pay,” n.d.). The President and Congress 
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make (and have made) adjustments to across-the-board and locality pay 
adjustments.   
4. Merit System Principles and Organizational Implementation 
The concept of merit in federal employment, and the implementation of a 
merit system evolved out of a need to reform the civil service, with the intent to 
move it away from being a spoils or patronage-based system and towards one 
based in merit principles. “Once a viable descriptor for the policies and practices 
that eliminated political influence in government hiring and promoted neutral 
competence in the workforce” merit has been reconstructed to denote greater 
fairness and equity within the civil service, and in rewarding competent 
performance (Woodward, 2005). 
The merit system principles are codified in law (“Merit System Principles 
(5 USC § 2301)”, n.d.) and form the conceptual framework to guide the practice 
of personnel management in organizations within the federal workforce in the 
executive branch. Ultimately, the nine Merit System Principles comprise high-
level guidance on how the personnel management functions of the federal 
government, as an organization, should deal in matters related to its employees. 
These core values have been adopted by OPM and are summarized in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Merit Systems Principles, taken from (“What Are Merit System Principles?,” 
n.d.). 
The merit system principles embrace the values of flexibility, adaptability, 
clarity, transparency, predictability, and consistency. These values, if properly 
and operationally translated, can provide the appropriate foundation for a 
personnel management system where high standards of integrity and 
performance are valued, encouraged, and rewarded, and poor performance and 
low integrity are not. A reformed civil service personnel management 
organization – one that more fully implements these principles - may be better 
poised to provide versatile, flexible, responses to the demands of federal 
government work in the 21st century. 
The merit system principles that are most relevant to this evaluation 
include those that address fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel 
management, including recruitment, job categorization, performance 
classification and compensation, retention, and with regard for incentives for 
• Recruit, select, and advance on merit after fair and open competition 
• Treat employees and applicants fairly and equitably 
• Provide equal pay for equal work and reward excellent performance 
• Maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest 
• Manage employees efficiently and effectively 
• Retain or separate employees on the basis of their performance 
• Educate and train employees if it will result in better organizational or individual 
performance 
• Protect employees from improper political influence 
• Protect employees against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information in 
"whistleblower" situations 
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performance enhancement and correction, such as pay-for-performance (P4P) 











III. CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES: AN ORGANIZATIONAL VIEW   
This evaluation includes review of several sources, including articles, 
panel proceedings, survey results, reports, and other documents. It shows that 
there is broad agreement that the civil service personnel management system is 
replete with shortcomings; however, little agreement exists on how to address 
these shortcomings. To define specific issues and identify possible points of 
leverage, specific observations and findings are distilled from an analysis of the 
existing literature and discussed below. Common threads emerge in two major 
categories that point to challenges and inadequacies within certain elements of 
the civil service system. These common threads are most apparent in three 
functional areas of civil service personnel management: job classification, 
selection/hiring, and compensation. These loci of dysfunction are highlighted by 
red X’s in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Diagram showing domains within the civil service personnel management system (of 
systems).  The X mark the loci of dysfunctional HOI between organizational and job elements of 
the civil service and its employees. While performance management, recruitment/retention, and 
hiring/selection are also affected, they are seen as consequences of the fundamental issues 
afflicting job classification, compensation, and advancement/promotion. 
 14 
Examination of the literature permitted identification of two overarching 
challenges: organizational rigidity and organizational unpredictability. While it 
may seem paradoxical that a system characterized as rigid can be 
simultaneously unpredictable, overly rigid systems - particularly complex human 
organizational systems - can induce unpredictability. Threat-rigidity is a concept 
borrowed from organizational behavior theory and initially developed by Barry M. 
Staw (Staw, Sandelands, Dutton, 1981) and describes how organizations behave 
when confronted with complexity that the organization is unprepared to deal with. 
Organizations are inclined to – among other things - become more hierarchical 
and top-down in terms of management control.  
In human factors engineering, it is not uncommon to witness the 
phenomenon of “work-around.” Work-arounds are defined as ways of 
accomplishing something using alternate means, and is often employed when an 
existing system doesn’t work well, when operators are confronted with poor user 
interface design. It is effectively an adaptation. When complex human systems 
are confronted with inflexible and poorly designed organizational interfaces, it 
should be unsurprising that multiple and varied workarounds are devised and 
implemented.  
This evaluation suggests a follow-on implication: rigidity from the top-down 
tends to promote work-around, which in turn establishes inconsistency and 
unpredictability from the bottom up. So, not only do external threats lead to 
rigidity, the resulting rigidity produces additional maladaptive organizational work-
arounds that increase complexity and may encourage additional rigidity that aims 
to eliminate the work-arounds. It is a two-way shuttle. 
The inherent rigidity of the civil service personnel management system 
has led various smaller federal organizations served by OPM to alter their 
personnel management systems through legislative approval or waiver, 
effectively working around OPM hierarchical structure. Smaller agency units and 
departments have implemented P4P concepts to some extent and these efforts 
have shown some promise (GAO, 2004).  However, this is not a broad, systemic 
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implementation. Pockets of meritocracy are created when specific policies 
regarding advancement differ across agencies. Where some agencies or work 
units implement performance rewards, corrective action strategies, different 
personnel flexibilities, and other performance structures and others do not, the 
result is patches of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ This produces an undesirable 
situation where different elements of government compete with each other for 
high-caliber employees “instead of approaching talent at a strategic, enterprise 
level on behalf of all of government” (Building the Enterprise, 2014). This 
‘balkanization’ also positions elements of the federal government against the 
private sector for recruitment or retention of talent (Sanders, 2014). The effects of 
this inequity can be expected to include negative impacts on morale, individual 
human performance, and organizational performance overall. In addition to 
becoming less equitable, the system also becomes more unpredictable. An 
employee who transfers from one department, agency, or business unit to 
another can encounter completely different personnel management practices, 
and this in turn can have markedly disparate effects on the job classification, 
compensation, and ultimately the career progression of a given employee.  
The major organizational challenges of rigidity and unpredictability 
represent the key HOI defects identified in this evaluation and are discussed 
below.  
A. CHALLENGE 1: RIGIDITY  
In this evaluation, rigidity is found to be one of the root systemic problems 
in the federal civil service personnel management system. There are specific 
impacts in the areas of job categorization, compensation, and 
promotion/advancement. Rigidity is marked by inflexibility and a resistance to 
change or novelty, and is in direct conflict with the merit system principles of 
flexibility and adaptability. In the civil service personnel management system, the 
rigid character of the HOI results from the imposition of successively more 
hierarchical and structured rules, standards, and procedures. Rigidity is 
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incompatible with a workforce that is increasingly professionalized, educated, 
and experienced, and with complex work and associated skill mixes that demand 
greater flexibility and adaptability. 
1. Rigidity in Compensation 
The GS system compensation policy, which was designed to create 
internal equity and retain employees in the long term, discourages management 
flexibility and workforce innovation. The 15-step, 10-grade GS performance 
categorization system highly automates assignment of incoming hires to a 
precise salary. Future advancement is predicated upon the compensation level 
(“GS grade”) that employees started out in their civil service career. There are 
three types of pay increases and monetary awards that are linked – to varying 
extents - to individual performance appraisals  
a. Within-grade increases 
Within-grade increases (WGI) are based primarily on time served, 
and secondarily on performance, in that employees must meet minimum 
acceptable performance standards. Merit, for the purposes of WGI, is minimally 
tied to performance and operationalized as anything better than poor 
performance. A true P4P system rooted in merit system principles would tie 
compensation more squarely to levels of performance that exceed standards or 
expectations. 
b. Ratings-based cash awards 
Ratings-based cash awards, or on-the-spot awards, are typically 
small, occasional, and inconsistently awarded across different organizations. 
They are tied to ratings achieved in the existing performance appraisal process. 
Inter-rater variability likely contributes to inappropriate and ineffective use of on-
the-spot awards as performance incentives. 
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c. Quality step increases 
Quality step increases (QSI) are a more substantive performance award, 
but this incentive is also inconsistently and unpredictably applied because 
agencies and their managers are permitted discretion, which means the process 
is highly subjective. QSIs are also encumbered by temporal rules (e.g., no more 
than one QSI can be awarded in a 52-week period). 
2. Rigidity in Job classification 
Generally speaking, the labor market overall has moved from a tradecraft-
based system to a knowledge-based system, and so too has much of 
government work (Hendrick, 2002). More specifically, federal jobs have 
increased in complexity and more frequently focus on longer-term threats and 
challenges (e.g., cybersecurity, Global War on Terror, development of 
sustainable energy). In the past fifteen years alone, the percentage of federal 
employees engaged in knowledge-based work has increased by approximately 
10%, while those in predominantly task or skill-oriented occupations has 
decreased by 5% (Building the Enterprise, 2014). 
There are many ways that the nature of work has shifted over this time. 
Hendrick (2002) argues that one of the major trends in human factors includes 
technology shifts related to increased automation, which has led to a true 
information age that necessitates changes to work systems, organizations, and 
associated interfaces. The workforce has also aged, matured, and become more 
professionalized. Certain value shifts also come into play; Hendrick notes that 
today’s knowledge workers value broader control over their work, which 
translates into a need for more broadly-defined work, from which today’s 
knowledge-workers are likely to be more engaged through a greater sense of 
responsibility and accomplishment. 
The job classification element of the civil service personnel system can be 
seen as outdated in terms of these shifts. The rigid and highly structured 
classification process no longer effectively accounts for or considers the 
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complexity of modern work or the people who perform it. “Work is rigidly defined 
by occupational series and grade, with very precise qualifications for each job” 
(Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory (STRL) Personnel 
Management Demonstration Project, 2010).  The system neither quickly nor 
easily responds to new ways of designing work and changes in the work itself.  
Categorization rigidity has produced a situation where job descriptions 
don’t describe today’s workforce. Because the personnel management system 
does not confer sufficient flexibility, hiring individuals who do not fit neatly into 
OPM-prescribed job categories becomes difficult or impossible. Managers can’t 
readily hire individuals who possess the skills the organization needs. The lack of 
flexibility to hire specialized talent is disadvantageous, particularly when suitably 
skilled, high-performing individuals are more likely to seek opportunities in the 
private sector or systems where employers possess more flexibility to define the 
skills they need and when/where they need them. It also points to a lack of 
adaptability, where managers cannot adjust their hiring to reflect mission 
requirements.  
These characteristics ultimately decrease an organization’s ability to 
perform in accordance with evolving mission requirements. Knowledge-based 
work requires personnel who possess a greater range of both hard and soft skills 
than the current, numerous, overly detailed job classifications contain. Managers 
and hiring authorities need greater flexibility in terms of who they can hire and 
when.  
3. Rigidity in Advancement and Promotion 
The GS performance classification structure and its associated pay scale 
essentially requires civil service employees to wait for a period of time before 
they can be promoted. Irrespective of QSIs discussed in the previous section, 
there remains enough rigidity in the advancement scheme that the civil service 
personnel management system prioritizes longevity over performance: rather 
than promoting workers who demonstrate excellence in civil service in a manner 
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that is responsive to that performance, the GS system requires that they may 
only advance based on the passage of time. The impact of this advancement 
rigidity is that ultimately those who regularly perform in ways that exceed 
standards will not be compensated fairly, and those who do not go above and 
beyond will still be rewarded with additional compensation eventually.  
The civil service personnel management system’s compensation and 
advancement policies, while intended to “encourage long-term tenure and 
internal equity” (Building the Enterprise, 2014), instead imposes unnecessary 
inflexibility and impairs the government’s ability to incentivize performance. This 
renders it inconsistent with merit principles and incompatible with the notions of 
pay for performance. Because advancement is based primarily in longevity, and 
since performance is a secondary factor (assuming an employee performs their 
duties as expected, advancement is simply a matter of time), it is incongruous 
with the merit system principle of rewarding outstanding performance.  
This is decidedly different from private sector organizations with personnel 
management structures where advancement is based on meeting pre-defined 
performance criteria in order to advance. Based on the longevity rubric inherent 
in the hierarchical GS grade and step structure, an employee who remains “in-
grade” (i.e., he or she does not apply for, qualify for, and obtain other positions at 
higher GS levels, and does not receive QSIs for whatever reason) will take 18 
years to automatically advance to the next GS grade.  
While there are elements of merit principles incorporated into the civil 
service system, the GS compensation structure does not feature merit pay or 
performance bonuses; it is not a P4P system. The GS pay structure was initially 
a government-wide compensation policy that resulted, intentionally or not, in the 
operationalization of pay “based on longevity rather than performance” 
(Woodward, 2005). Promotions, or GS step increases in pay, are automatic, 
assuming that an acceptable level of performance is maintained. Top performers 
aren’t rewarded sufficiently, and poor performers are rarely let go because the 
GS system isn’t geared towards rewarding top performers or punishing poor 
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ones (Building the Enterprise, 2014). Thus, under the GS compensation 
structure, a high-performing worker may receive the same pay as another who 
doesn’t go above and beyond.  
B. CHALLENGE 2: UNPREDICTABILITY  
Whether by design or because existing rules aren’t implemented uniformly 
or properly, the civil service personnel system demonstrates an uneven 
implementation of promotion and other performance incentives across and 
between different federal agencies and business units. These policies and 
procedures differ because over time, the personnel management system has 
changed from a centrally-controlled, one-size fits all model to one where 
individual agencies have been made responsible for implementation. The result 
is a system characterized by unpredictability.  
Predictability at the organizational system level should be a chief concern 
for employers, both broadly and in the realm of knowledge work, because it can 
affect employee performance.  Where jobs with requisite task sets are defined by 
unpredictability (the mission can and does change frequently), the presence of 
additional unpredictability imposed by the organizational structure, practice, and 
culture introduces extraneous burden of uncertainty. “Employees need to know 
what they can expect and what’s expected of them, [that] opportunities for 
rewards are consistent across the organization, [and that] there is a review 
process to identify any problems that arise” (Risher, 2009). 
The literature about the civil service personnel management system 
illustrates a pervasive challenge in certain areas: a lack of predictability.  While 
the system suffers from rigidity and inflexibility in some areas as a result of over-
standardization and over-regulation, it simultaneously exhibits inconsistency and 
unpredictability due to under-definition in other areas. In this evaluation, 
unpredictability was particularly apparent in processes and practices associated 
with performance categorization, advancement/promotion, and compensation. 
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1. Unpredictability in Compensation 
The problem of advancement and job performance categorization 
unpredictability across different departments, agencies, and business units also 
produces unpredictability in compensation. The GS compensation system, while 
originally designed with the intent of maintaining ‘internal equity,’ does not 
consistently produce broader parity, or fairness. Performance is not consistently 
rewarded across the civil service, which is not consistent with the prediction – a 
reasonable one – that compensation should somehow be reflective of work effort. 
The GS level (the job performance level) at which an employee is hired and the 
steps or levels to which that employee may or may not advance directly dictates 
compensation (Figure 2.) Because of this, there can arise situations where there 
is a lack of pay parity between equally skilled/equally-accomplished employees, 
or where more skilled/accomplished individuals make less. These occurrences 
are inconsistent with a true merit system. 
An additional problem in civil service compensation regards the 
differences in compensation between the private and government sectors. Pay 
isn’t tied to the broader labor market, and this affects the government’s ability to 
compete for talent (Building the Enterprise, 2014). Various surveys indicate that 
some occupations are underpaid, while others are overpaid. This is partly related 
to the separate issue of job classification rigidity, which makes it difficult for the 
federal government to adapt hiring to actual skill needs. The best-qualified 
applicants in occupations that have more recently become critical to support the 
government’s mission can be expected to make more in the private sector. “The 
universal practice in every other sector is to rely on salary survey data for 
commonly defined jobs (referred to as benchmark jobs). That approach has been 
used for years to adjust Federal Wage System pay levels and by agencies that 
use market analyses” (Risher, 2014). Unfortunately, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics ceased collecting and reporting this data over two decades ago.  
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2. Unpredictability in Job classification and Performance 
Categorization 
Title 5 provisions (Chapter 51) dictates the heirarchical definition of both 
job classification and work performance at each grade level. Actual 
implementation is less formalized: Risher (2012) observes, “The problem is that 
there is no assurance jobs are assigned to the correct GS grade…[or] that two 
employees doing similar jobs are paid at the same GS level.”  
Specifically, classifying occupations and developing position 
descriptions in the GS system requires officials to maintain an 
understanding of the individual position and the nuances between 
similar occupations. Without this understanding, the transparency 
and internal equity of the system may be inhibited, as agency 
officials may not be classifying positions consistently, comparable 
employees may not be treated equitably, and the system may seem 
unpredictable. (GAO, 2014) 
There are additional problems associated with defining levels and steps of 
job performance. For example, “the difference between a GS-12 accountant and 
a GS-13 accountant…is difficult to define, which in turn has lessened the 
transparency in the system” (Katz, 2014). Finally, the classification standards are 
lengthy and suffer from over-standardization. As a result, the process to update 
them is so costly and time consuming that it hasn’t been overhauled in over 25 
years (Risher, 2014, Clark, 2014). A GAO report (2014) observed: “Several 
studies have concluded that the GS system was not meeting the needs of the 
modern federal workforce or supporting agency missions, and some studies 
suggested reductions in the number of occupational series and grade levels to 
help simplify the system.” 
3. Unpredictability in Advancement and Promotion 
For purposes of within-grade step increases, there is a lack of clarity 
pertaining to what constitutes acceptable performance. The standard 
advancement path in the GS system is a nearly two-decade evolution for a single 
grade level. However, some employees can apply for and obtain different 
positions at higher GS grades, which effectively speeds up the advancement 
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process. Some employees, in part due to aforementioned job classification 
rigidity, are not as privy to such options. 
It is entirely possible that in some units, employees who consistently 
perform well will in fact achieve quality step increases and therefore advance 
more quickly through the GS levels. In other agencies, due to differences in legal 
authority and personnel policy implementation, this may not happen either as 
frequently or as rapidly. In real terms, because of the way that some units have 
adopted and implemented the GS system, an accomplished GS-13 may not 
obtain a quality step increase to a GS-14 in a reasonable time or at all, for any 
number of reasons. Not all employees remain “in grade” and instead advance 
more rapidly. Some top performers are granted quality step increases (maximum 
of one per year) (Building the Enterprise, 2014). As a corollary, some aren’t.   
C. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VIEWPOINT SURVEYS 
OPM makes regular efforts to understand and appraise the civil service 
system, and outputs are used to adapt policy. One of these efforts is the Federal 
Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). The survey is conducted by OPM and was 
originally incepted as the Federal Human Capital Survey. The survey is used as 
a tool to gather opinions on federal employment experiences. It is a useful tool 
for gauging employee perspective on their jobs, agencies, and the federal 
government overall as an employer. It can be seen as a measurement tool to 
assess the state of the civil service system, and a guide to where there are 
problems that need to be addressed. The data it elicits can be used to identify, 
support, and justify where and what types of changes need to be made to 
improve the HOI. 
In 2013, the agencies and departments that participated in the survey 
comprised approximately 97% of the executive branch. This does not mean that 
97% of employees participated, but that 97% of federal agencies/departments 
were represented. Over 687,000 employees participated in 2012, 376,577 in 
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2013, and 392,752 in 2014 (“Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey,” 2012, 2013, 
2014). 
a. 2012 Survey 
In 2012, less than 2% of respondents either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement “When needed I am willing to put in the extra effort 
to get a job done.” Almost 97% agreed or strongly agreed. In contrast, just over 
35% agreed or strongly agreed when asked whether “promotions in my work unit 
are based on merit.” In response to “Awards in my work unit depend on how well 
employees perform their jobs,” over 32% disagreed or strongly disagreed 
(“Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey,” 2012) 
b. 2013 Survey 
In the 2013 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, results show that 81.5% 
of respondents say that they are “held accountable for achieving results,” but 
only 18.6% of employees believe that pay raises are dependent on how well they 
perform their jobs. Just over 30% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement “in my work unit, steps are taken to deal with a poor performer who 
cannot or will not improve” (“Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey,” 2013). Of the 
remainder, 27.9% neither agreed nor disagreed, 21.7% disagreed, and 20.1% 
strongly disagreed. 
c. 2014 Survey 
Less than 40% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement “my work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills.” Almost 26% 
indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed, 20.5% disagreed, and 12.2% 
strongly disagreed. Results from 2104 on management of poor performance also 
echoed those from prior years: in response to “In my work unit, steps are taken to 
deal with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve,” 21.4% disagreed and 
20.3% strongly disagreed. Nearly 40% of respondents either disagreed or 
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strongly disagreed with the statement “differences in performance are recognized 
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IV. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
Several initiatives have been undertaken over the nearly seven decades 
since the earliest civil service reforms to alleviate existing problems in the civil 
service system and to invoke greater compliance with merit system principles; 
several (but not all) are discussed here.  
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 introduced the Merit Pay System 
(MPS), which sought to implement pay for performance, or P4P. The intent was 
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of federal managers. MPS received 
harsh criticism, as do most attempts at civil service reform. Employee and 
management feedback showed problems with “communication of performance 
expectations and feedback on performance. There are perceived inaccuracies in 
performance ratings with general agreement that the ratings are inflated and 
often unevenly distributed by grade, occupation and geographic location” (STRL 
Personnel Management Demonstration Project, 2010). 
The Merit Pay System (MPS) ultimately failed because of pay inequity, 
invalid performance appraisals, and insufficient funding to implement pay raises 
(Perry and Petrakis, 1988).  
 In 1978 reformers failed to radically change the civil service 
system, but instead settled for incremental change. This pattern 
has recurred, as the rise of the flexibility doctrine has resulted only 
in partial reform of the civil service system. Over time, the civil 
service system became an institution difficult to change, effectively 
defended by public service unions. While flexibility proponents hope 
to dramatically change government-wide personnel rules, their rare 
attempts to do so have failed. Instead, reformers have chipped 
away at the system in piecemeal fashion, achieving a gradual shift 
toward flexibility through a combination of executive orders, 
personnel legislation for specific agencies, or provision of 
experimental flexibility for parts of government. As a result, the 
different parts of the present federal public sector, to varying 
degrees, reflect both the continuing legacy of the protection 
doctrine and the growing influence of the flexibility doctrine. 
(Moynihan, 2004) 
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Another reform initiative led to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1980, which 
implemented a performance management model and led to the earliest 
“demonstration programs.” Ultimately, this model came under criticism due to 
“inadequate communication of performance expectations and feedback on 
performance” and a perception that ratings were inaccurate (STRL Personnel 
Management Demonstration Project, 2010). 
In 1984, Congress created the Performance Management and 
Recognition System (PMRS), which supplanted the prior legislation that created 
MPS, and attempted to address its failures. PMRS covered managers in grades 
13, 14, and 15, and also attempted to develop and integrate merit pay into the 
GS system (Perry, Petrakis & Miller, 1989). PMRS required more formalized 
performance ratings (on a 1-5 scale, unacceptable to outstanding), and 
implemented agency review boards to validate, review, and approve 
performance standards. The size and functioning of the boards was not 
prescribed. Under PMRS, raises of 2-10% were mandatory for those receiving 
the highest possible ranking. A total payroll upper limit of 1.5% was also 
imposed. PMRS was abandoned in 1991, due to the system’s inability to 
sufficiently distinguish levels of performance, data that suggested the system 
didn’t result in measurable performance improvement, and feedback that 
performance rewards were inadequate. 
The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was authorized by 
Congress in 2004 and implemented in the Department of Defense (DoD) starting 
in 2006. One of the chief goals of NSPS was to improve flexibility in 
compensation, specifically in the establishment of compensation levels. This was 
accomplished by reducing career groups to only four, using fewer, wider, pay 
bands to replace the numerous GS grades and steps, changing policies 
associated with longevity and promotion, and introducing new means of 
assessing and rewarding performance. NSPS was designed to eliminate 
automatic pay raises that exist in the GS pay structure. While the program was 
well intentioned, "implementation failed to follow design” (Mazmanian, 2014). An 
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analysis of the system included findings that the rating system was not 
transparent because the implementation of performance ratings, salaries, and 
merit bonuses did not comport with performance ratings (Monroe, 2009). Other 
inequalities were also noted: uneven and discriminatory across agencies, service 
branches, gender, race/ethnicity, and age (Losey, 2008). Other complaints were 
centered on the bureaucratic costs of flexibility introduced by the new system. 
Ultimately, NSPS was repealed and all  Department of Defense employees were 
restored to the GS system by 2012. However, certain provisions of NSPS were 
migrated to subsequent, smaller systems (“demonstration projects”) within DoD. 
One of many demonstration projects is the Science and Technology 
Reinvention Laboratory (STRL) system, established legislatively by subsequent 
amendments to Title 5. These amendments authorized the DoD to depart 
significantly from the GS system, and this departure can be seen as an 
institutionalized work-around produced by poor HOI design. Personnel 
demonstration projects were implemented to examine the effects of smaller-scale 
changes in the personnel management system on performance outcomes. China 
Lake was the earliest implementation, and this effort was expanded to other 
similar organizations within DoD (other S&T reinvention labs). Like NSPS, the 
STRL demonstration project uses pay bands instead of GS grades, simplifies job 
classification by broadening and reducing job categories, and attempts to link 
compensation to performance. 
The stated goal of the STRL system is to “enhance and sustain the quality 
and professionalism of the covered organizations' workforces through 
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the human resource system. 
The [demonstration] project interventions…strive to achieve the best workforce 
for the mission, adjust the workforce for change, and improve workforce 
satisfaction” (STRL Personnel Management Demonstration Project, 2010). 
While it is true that these demonstration projects have given the 
implementing organizations more control, and that this control is decentralized 
from OPM, it is important to note that OPM still requires that agencies who hold 
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Title 5 exemptions must create alternative performance management systems 
based on the Merit System Principles. 
A. THE HOI ISSUE:  A LACK OF ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE 
There is no doubt that the intent of OPM’s organizational policy, as it was 
developed over time, was to establish consistency across the organization and 
with the merit system principles, which are enduring and should remain the 
fundamental underpinning of the personnel management system of the federal 
workforce. What is missing from the high-level synopsis of core values captured 
in the codified merit system principles, however, is a translation and 
implementation of these merit principles into specific organizational behaviors 
and practices. This missing link is highlighted in Figure 5. Woodward (2005) 
notes that the merit system principles “carry little operational guidance for 
managers or clear guidelines for developing new [personnel management] 
systems.”  
It is no small task to derive and develop clear, transparent, practical 
operational guidance from those principles in a way that provides meaningful 
consistency, but that doesn’t over-impose unnecessarily rigid structure.  As 
challenging as it may be, the motivation for doing so is clear; the apparent lack of 
guidance has led to inconsistency, lack of transparency, and rigidity in specific 
areas of the civil service personnel management system. The organization needs 




Figure 5. Notional diagram depicting the relationship between merit system principles and 
performance management implementation. A lack of operational guidance prohibits successful 
implementation of the merit system principles. 
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNADDRESSED HOI PROBLEMS 
Persistence of many elements of a decades-old system, and ongoing 
resistance to change has affected and continues to affect members of the civil 
service workforce that interface with the organization. There are numerous 
consequences – at the HOI level - to leaving the current organizational policy 
structures and their implementation in the civil service unaddressed, and those 
consequences include (but are not limited to) those summarized below. 
1. Ineffective management 
Managers cannot truly perform as managers when they are unable to 
adapt to changes in mission requirements (by hiring the right people with the 
right skills). The system doesn’t encourage intervention and doesn’t compel or 
incentivize managers to hold poor performers accountable; managers aren’t held 
accountable for certain outcomes (Building the Enterprise, 2014). 
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2. Ineffectual performance 
Managers (and the larger performance management organization 
structure) are inhibited or even prevented from rewarding skilled performance 
that truly benefits the mission and the public interest. Employees are not 
rewarded for going above and beyond. The reduced morale that accompanies 
this existing incongruity may also deter employees from spending time on less-
noticeable but important tasks. 
3. Inequity 
Higher-performing employees aren’t compensated more than others who 
perform minimally acceptable work, which sends the unfortunate message that 
performance isn’t prioritized as much as other factors (like longevity). The 
compensation status of GS employees is a matter of public record or can be 
deduced by simply knowing what their GS level is; this can (and does) greatly 
affect how they are perceived and treated. An additional problem also arises with 
imposition of an inequitable rank structure within teams, where leaders or high-
performers may be lower in rank (and pay) than team members who are more 
senior only as a function of time-served. 
4. Entrenchment and stagnation 
The value system promoted currently, where pay raises are granted based 
mostly on the amount of time served, means that employees expect to be 
rewarded for how long they remain in federal employment, less so on their job 
performance. This characteristic does not motivate improved performance or 
promote innovation, can demoralize or discourage top performers and even alter 
their behavior. It’s also in conflict with the third merit system principle that calls 
for rewarding excellent performance.  
5. Talent loss and subsequent collective skill obsolescence  
One key perception (of the public, and therefore potential future 
employees) is that the system is too ‘one size fits all,’ that pay is not for 
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performance. Both pay/advancement and job classification structures do not 
quickly or easily respond to new ways of designing work and changes in the work 
itself. Persistence of this incongruity results in understaffing for longer periods 
and may lead employees to leave the civil service. It also deters would-be 
employees who possess the skills that a modern federal workforce needs. 
In the federal civil service, the option chosen long ago – given a lack of 
nuanced operationalized guidance – was to layer on increasingly complex rules. 
This produced a system that featured rigidity, which in turn prompted some 
agencies to develop workarounds, and from which evolved inconsistency of 
application and then unpredictability. The solution, from a macroergonomic 
perspective, is to develop and nurture an organizational culture that demands 
and values flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness, while simultaneously 
retaining features of clarity, transparency, and equity. While a tall order, these 
organizational fixes would lend themselves to the modern realities of today’s 
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V. DISCUSSION 
There are areas of incongruity in the U.S. civil service personnel 
management system where the HOI is poorly designed or implemented.  Over 
time and due to workarounds, elements of unpredictability have evolved out of 
the rigidity imposed by the organization. The current human-organizational 
interface exhibits systemic problems that negatively affect performance at the 
individual, organizational, and mission-effectiveness levels.  
This review identified and focused on specific elements within the 
personnel management system that need to change. Effort should be applied by 
OPM and their component agencies to target specific areas of rigidity, 
complexity, and hierarchical structure to improve the predictability, 
responsiveness, and flexibility of the civil service personnel management system. 
OPM should translate the merit system principles through improved operational 
guidance to more accurately mirror and more fully implement those principles. If 
this is accomplished, it will lead to improved harmonization between the 
organizational system and civil service employees who interact with it. 
Recommendations produced from this evaluation include macroergonomic 
interventions intended to reduce some of the problematic characteristics of the 
civil service personnel management system, focusing on an improved HOI. They 
address predictability, flexibility, and adaptability. 
• Predictability: A system that functions predictably will behave and respond 
consistently and in ways that employees can anticipate, predict, or understand 
(and that management can measure). Greater predictability at the organizational 
level reduces discord and dissatisfaction and allows employees to focus on their 
primary tasks. 
• Flexibility: A flexible system will readily permit those who work within it to 
accomplish what they need to. Greater flexibility as imparted by the personnel 
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management organization can ease the complexity and burden imposed on 
employees and supervisors by over-rigid rules and processes. 
• Adaptability: An adaptable system characterized will respond appropriately and 
efficiently to changes in the external environment (e.g., changed mission, changed 
labor market).  Personnel management systems play a promoting or inhibiting role 
in terms of fostering adaptability. 
Addressing the problems identified in these areas will lead to better 
harmonization of the work system. However, these are large, complex, systemic 
problems, and there is no simple formula that, once applied, will easily eliminate 
them. The type of extensive changes required to fully address all of these issues 
are extremely difficult to establish. Given the results of past attempts at large-
scale reform, they may be ineffective. Some lines of work indicate that an 
obvious strategy to increase the likelihood of successful change is to use an 
incremental approach rather than a complete overhaul (Hendrick, 2002; Building 
the Enterprise, 2014). 
Generally, even in the private sector, organizations and their employees 
are leery of sudden, broad, and fundamental changes to the way they interact. 
Smaller, incremental, and iterative changes afford an opportunity for both the 
personnel management system and its employees to explore the impacts and 
consequences of various fixes. This is akin to the use of mock-ups and 
prototypes in human factors engineering; both good and bad prototypes are used 
iteratively to converge on a final, optimized design. If prototype changes are 
successful, it encourages both organizations and employees that implementing 
change more broadly will also be successful. Prototype demonstrations that are 
met with good results also encourage openness to additional macroergonomic 
intervention (Hendrick, 2002). 
Some interventions are already implemented on a smaller scale in the 
form of agency-level or sub-agency demonstration programs detailed previously, 
and others created by way of legislation (waiver or otherwise). They too provide 
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an opportunity to appraise the successfulness of these pilot programs, and 
lessons learned in the demonstration programs inform some of the 
recommendations here. 
The STRL demonstration projects are the vehicles through which 
the laboratories and the Department of Defense will determine 
whether changes in personnel management concepts, policies, or 
procedures would result in improved laboratory performance and 
contribute to improved DoD or Federal personnel management. 
(Department of Defense, 2009) 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
OPM, as an organization, has a central mission and associated objectives. 
For the organization to fulfill part of its mission and many of its objectives, it 
needs to revisit its policies to address problems of rigidity and unpredictability in 
hiring/selection, job classification, and compensation to produce better 
harmonization between the nature of government work and the employees that 
do the work. The GS system has existed in essentially the same form since its 
inception 65 years ago and was designed for a workforce that no longer exists. 
Workers and work have changed. 
The system should be designed to more easily attract, hire, 
promote and retain the best-qualified employees, and place greater 
attention on the development of leaders. It should be based on 
state-of-the-art human capital practices and have a total 
compensation system that is occupation- specific and market-
sensitive. And it should have career paths that support progression 
and job mobility, and be designed to reward performance, not just 
time on the federal payroll. (Building the Enterprise, 2014) 
Several recommendations were developed to aid in instilling greater 
flexibility, adaptability and predictability in the civil service personnel 
management system and are discussed below. 
1. Determine the Facts 
Ultimately, thorough analyses are required to determine the facts 
regarding various problems in federal civil service personnel management and 
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then gain agreement on them. This information is necessary to engage with and 
make a successful case to stakeholders and to transcend the current political 
climate, both inside and outside OPM. 
2. Improve Translation and Operationalization of the Merit 
System Principles 
Implement better translation of the merit system principles through 
relevant operational guidance for the organization. OPM needs to more clearly 
define and apply merit system principles/values to guide the reform process, and 
this should be done in such a way as to replace existing organizational strictures. 
Once implemented, it will permit employees and their supervisors to spend less 
time trying to work-around the defects in the current system. 
3. Adjust the Intrinsic Values of Performance and Longevity 
Longevity shouldn’t be completely removed as a value, because 
institutional knowledge is important. However, it should be promoted in a way 
that doesn’t de-prioritize performance improvement. It is preferable to maintain or 
increase retention using other means than pay raises. The intent is to increase 
job satisfaction by increasing harmonization between the knowledge workforce 
and the associated personnel management system through less rigidity and 
formalization. 
4. Simplify job classification 
Task analysis can be applied to establish common work across 
occupations and create larger, less complex categories. Some demonstration 
programs (like STRL in DoD) have already adopted broader and fewer 
occupational categories. Descriptions should more broadly reflect the 
overarching tasks that an employee will perform. They should not be overly 
detailed in their precise and narrow description of tasks; rather, they should 
convey the appropriate level of complexity and requirement for mixtures of skills, 
and tie them to desired outcomes. Reducing the complexity of job classification 
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enables new ways of designing work and improves adaptability to changes in the 
work itself; it also reduces the amount of time OPM currently spends on job 
classification. 
5. Apply Lessons Learned  
There exists a wealth of insight that can be gleaned from both current 
demonstration projects and past legislative attempts at reform, in addition to the 
expansive literature on the subject of civil service reform. OPM would do well to 
consider implementing successful elements of demonstration projects and 
alternative systems more broadly. Given the relative success of these 
incremental reforms, OPM should also initiate additional small demonstration 
projects to address other areas of interface dysfunction that still affect the civil 
service personnel management system:  
…Agencies have sought exceptions to the GS system to mitigate 
some of its limitations either through demonstration projects or 
congressionally authorized alternative personnel systems—often 
featuring a broadband approach that provided fewer, broader 
occupational groups and grade levels. By using lessons learned 
and the results from prior studies to examine ways to make the GS 
system more consistent with the attributes of a modern, effective 
classification system, OPM could better position itself to help 
ensure that the system is keeping pace with the government’s 
evolving requirements. (GAO, 2014) 
6. Implement a Robust Performance Appraisal Process 
Performance appraisal standards and process should be used to a) reflect 
and appraise the work that employees do, and b) reduce inconsistencies among 
raters. A performance appraisal study found that the “developmental use of 
performance appraisal, employee participation in performance standard setting, 
the quality of the relationship they have with their supervisors, and employee 
perceived empowerment are positively associated with employee acceptance” 
(Kim & Holzer, 2014). Reworking the performance appraisal system requires 
OPM to work with federal agencies it serves to develop, review, and validate 
definitions of what differentiates minimally acceptable performance from 
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outstanding performance, and disincentivize poor performance. The performance 
appraisal process must be improved - whether or not P4P – or some permutation 
of P4P - is implemented. 
7. Implement P4P 
Merit pay is defined as increased monetary compensation for an 
employee in exchange for increased performance, as defined by an employer 
(Montemayor, 1993). The corollary is that there should be no increases if 
performance doesn’t meet or exceed expectations. This strategy ostensibly 
motivates employees to improve performance outcomes through pay raises. 
Some areas of theory (expectancy theory) and research suggest that merit 
bonuses - rather than merit increases to base salary - may be a better option for 
various reasons, including that it may meet with greater acceptance (Lowery et 
al, 2002).  
 “Expectancy theory suggests the conditions under which [merit 
pay] will be attractive to employees (Bartol and Locke, 2000). There 
are three main elements: effort will result in improved performance, 
good performance will be recognised and rewarded by 
management, and the employee values the reward. In equity theory 
(Adams, 1963) an individual compares their outcome-input ratio to 
that of a comparitor. There are three possible outcomes: equity, 
under-reward inequity and over-reward inequity. Inequity generates 
a range of employee reactions in order to restore equity 
perceptions.” (Brown, 2001)  
The GS system is the only pay system to be broadly implemented across 
the white-collar federal workforce. To date, there is still no P4P system that has 
been implemented on a broad scale in the federal civil service. This means that 
currently, longevity is a greater predictor of compensation increase than 
meritorious service. That prior efforts have failed is no reason not to do this; 
instead, the way in which it is implemented needs to change. The discussion 
should certainly be reframed: “Federal leaders should frame the discussion in 
terms of how to ‘update the federal approach to compensation so that it is more 
relevant to today’s environment.’” (Monroe, 2009). 
 41 
 
Merit pay and bonuses are already used in various demonstration projects 
in DoD and in the intelligence community. Merit pay and/or merit bonuses need 
to be considered, and future attempts must be guided by lessons learned from 

















The complex challenges and opportunities of the 21st century require a 
federal civil service workforce that can meet multi-faceted and ever-changing 
demands. The work – and therefore management - of the federal workforce will 
continue to be and become increasingly important. The U.S. federal government, 
as an employer, is different than any other, in that its employees  - civil servants - 
work for the American people. It is also the nation’s largest employer, and must 
model effective personnel management that advances the many ideals 
represented in the merit system principles. The civilians who serve this country 
deserve no less than a highly relevant, responsive, and responsible personnel 
organization. Both OPM and the larger field of public personnel management are 
uniquely poised to influence the future of government work. Numerous 
opportunities for reform, a nuanced approach to implementation, and applying 
lessons learned will improve the likelihood that the interface can be optimized.  
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